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Abstract: 
Exchanges in Europe are in a process of consolidation. After the failure of the proposed 
merger between Deutsche Börse and Euronext, these two groups are likely to become the 
nuclei for further mergers and co-operation with currently independent exchanges. A decision 
for one of the groups entails a decision for the respective trading platform. Against that 
background we evaluate the attractiveness of the two dominant continental European trading 
systems. Though both are anonymous electronic limit order books, there are important 
differences in the trading protocols. We use a matched-sample approach to compare execution 
costs in Euronext Paris and Xetra. We find that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in 
Xetra. When decomposing the spread we find no systematic differences in the adverse 
selection component. Realized spreads, on the other hand, are significantly higher in 
Euronext. Neither differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements nor differences 
in the minimum tick size or in the degree of domestic competition for order flow explain the 
different spread levels. We thus conclude that Xetra is the more efficient trading system.  
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1  Introduction 
European exchanges are in a process of consolidation. Banks and institutional investors are 
putting pressure on exchange officials to decrease transaction costs. The fragmentation of 
European exchanges has been identified as one source of high transaction costs. Mergers be-
tween exchanges and the joint use of trading systems are considered to be part of the solu-
tion.
1 As Jacques de Larosiere, former governor of the Banque de France and former presi-
dent of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, puts it:
2  
At national and cross-border level [...] traditional stock markets are being obliged 
to regroup in order to secure the economies of scale essential if they are to be-
come competitive at European level.  
Currently there are two major players in continental Europe, Euronext and Deutsche 
Börse. In 2000 the French Stock Exchange (ParisBourseSBF SA.) merged with the exchanges 
in Amsterdam, Brussels and (in 2002) Lisboa to form Euronext. The common trading plat-
form has been in operation since 2001. The London-based derivatives exchange LIFFE joined 
the Euronext group in 2002. Deutsche Börse AG merged its derivatives trading subsidiary, 
Deutsche Terminbörse AG, with the Swiss derivatives exchange SOFFEX to form EUREX 
which became the world’s largest derivatives exchange. The exchanges in Austria and Ireland 
have adopted Deutsche Börse's electronic trading system Xetra.  
Deutsche Börse has recently proposed a merger with Euronext. Under the terms of the pro-
posal, Deutsche Börse would have abandoned its trading system Xetra in favor of Euronext's 
trading system. Despite political pressure in favour of a "European solution" Euronext re-
 
1  For a theoretical treatment of the issue see di Noia (2001).  
2  The statement was made in a speech at the Brussels Economic Forum in May 2002. The manuscript can be 
downloaded at http://www.asmp.fr/fiches_academiciens/textacad/larosiere/eurofi.pdf.    2
jected the offer and rather decided to merge with the New York Stock Exchange. In Novem-
ber 2006 Deutsche Börse AG officially withdrew its offer.  
As a consequence, the two trading systems, Xetra and Euronext, will continue to coexist. 
Deutsche Börse has already announced that it will seek to grow in Middle and Eastern Europe 
and in Asia. The NYSE-Euronext group is likely to pursue similar goals. Thus, the process of 
consolidation among European exchanges will continue and will lead currently independent 
exchanges to join the NYSE-Euronext group or Deutsche Börse, either by way of a merger or 
by way of cooperation. The decision to join either group entails a choice between the two 
trading systems. The quality of the trading system, although certainly not the only criterion, 
should play a role in that decision. Recently published plans by a group of large investment 
banks to establish a pan-European trading platform for stocks will increase the pressure on 
exchanges to strive for efficiency.  
Against that background a comparison of the trading systems of Euronext and Deutsche Börse 
is certainly warranted. The objective of our paper is to provide such a comparison. We create 
matched samples of stocks that are similar with respect to the characteristics that are known to 
determine the bid-ask spread. Using market capitalization, trading volume, price and volatility 
as matching criteria we form two samples of 40 pairs of stocks each. A pair consists of one 
French stock traded on Euronext Paris and one German stock traded in Xetra. Our approach is 
similar to that of Venkataraman (2001), Ellul (2002) and Gajewski and Gresse (2004). The 
analysis relies on intradaily data and on transaction cost measures that are standard in the mi-
crostructure literature.  
The main results can be summarized as follows. Both quoted and effective spreads are lower 
in Xetra. We decompose the spread into an adverse selection component and the realized 
spread and find that there are no systematic differences in the adverse selection component   3
whereas the realized spreads are lower in Xetra. This results indicates that Euronext offers 
lower operational efficiency.  
We then test whether differences in market organization can explain these findings. Specifi-
cally, we consider differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements, and differ-
ences in the minimum tick size. None of these characteristics fully explains the higher execu-
tion costs in Euronext. Finally, we test whether (domestic) competition for order flow has a 
bearing on the transaction costs. Euronext Paris does not face domestic competition. In Ger-
many, on the other hand, Xetra competes with the floor of the Frankfurt stock exchange and 
several regional exchanges. The intensity of the competitive pressure, as measured by the 
market share of Xetra, varies considerably across stocks. When including this variable in our 
analysis, however, we find that the degree of domestic competition does not explain the dif-
ferences in execution costs either.  
These results are of importance to exchanges, corporations, investors, and regulators. They 
suggest that Xetra is the more efficient trading system. This result should be taken into con-
sideration when currently independent exchanges decide whether to join one of the two large 
groups. A failure to opt for the more efficient trading system may result in an elevated level 
of execution costs for investors, higher cost of equity for corporations and generally a lower 
level of operational efficiency.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief survey of the literature. In sec-
tion 3 we provide a detailed description of the trading systems under scrutiny. Section 4 de-
scribes the data set and the matching procedure and presents descriptive statistics. In section 5 
we compare the transaction costs in Xetra and Euronext. Section 6 is devoted to attempts at 
explaining the differences in transaction costs. Section 7 offers a concluding discussion.    4
2  A Brief Survey of the Literature 
When comparing execution costs across exchanges it is necessary to take into account the fact 
that there are differences in the characteristics of the listed companies. In order to trace differ-
ences in execution costs back to the design of the trading systems one thus needs to control 
for stock characteristics.  
There are two principal approaches to achieve this. The first is to analyze identical 
stocks traded in both markets, e.g. French stocks which are cross-listed in Xetra or vice versa. 
This approach has (among others) been used by Pagano and Röell (1990), Schmidt and 
Iversen (1993), de Jong, Nijman and Röell (1995) and Degryse (1997) to compare the cost of 
trading continental European stocks in their home market and in the London-based SEAQ 
system. The disadvantage of analyzing cross-listed stocks is that the home market has a natu-
ral liquidity advantage (Piwowar 1997). Adopting this approach would most likely yield the 
result that Euronext Paris offers lower trading costs for French stocks whereas Xetra offers 
lower costs for German stocks.  
The second approach is to compare stocks which are similar with respect to those 
characteristics that determine liquidity. The resulting matched sample procedure has been 
used to compare execution costs on NYSE and Nasdaq (Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller, 
1994; Huang and Stoll, 1996; Bessembinder and Kauffman, 1996) and in pure limit order 
books, hybrid systems and dealership markets (Ellul 2002). Venkataraman (2001) uses a 
matched sample approach to compare US stocks listed on the NYSE and French stocks traded 
in NSC (the predecessor of Euronext Paris). His focus is on comparing floor-based and elec-
tronic trading. Gajewski and Gresse (2004) compare transaction costs on Euronext Paris to 
those on the London Stock Exchange. Ellul (2002) compares French stocks traded on the 
CAC system (the predecessor of NSC), German stocks traded on IBIS (the predecessor of   5
                                                
Xetra) and UK stocks traded on the SEAQ system. These systems differ with respect to the 
degree of dealer intervention. He finds that spreads in IBIS are the lowest.  
Some recent papers have performed multi-country comparisons of execution costs. Do-
mowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) report one-way implicit costs (basically a variant of the 
effective half-spread) of 0.067% for France and 0.134% for Germany. The data covers the 
years 1995-98. The paper does not provide information on the composition of the sample. It is 
unclear whether the data for Germany is from the floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange or 
from the electronic trading system (IBIS until November 1997, Xetra thereafter), and no in-
formation on the number and characteristics of the firms included in the sample is provided.  
Based on unmatched samples of 250 stocks each, Swan and Westerholm (2004) report that 
average effective spreads are 1.00% in Xetra but only 0.46% in Euronext. Jain (2001) finds an 
average quoted spread of 3.65% for the sample of all German stocks (0.86% for the 15 largest 
firms) and of 3.60% for the sample of all French stocks (0.23% for the 15 largest firms). Lon-
don Economics (2002) reports effective spreads of 5.27% for Germany and 6.83% for 
France.
3 The results of these multi-country comparisons differ by several orders of magni-
tude. This may, at least in part, be due to two inherent drawbacks of the approach. First, in a 
multi-country analysis it is difficult, if not impossible, to control for differing stock character-
istics. Second, data requirements are very high as data for all countries in the sample is 
needed. The country with the lowest level of data availability determines the design of the 
 
3  This study, a report to the European Commission, raises questions about the methodology used. The authors 
claim (p. 24) that they are using daily closing bid, ask, and transaction prices. However, the number of Ger-
man stocks included in their study far exceeds the number of continuously traded domestic stocks. The same 
is true for French stocks, as pointed out by Davydoff et al. (2002). This raises the question of how bid and 
ask prices for stocks that only trade in a call auction are defined, and how they are used to calculate spread 
measures.    6
study. As a consequence, multi-country studies are often based on less detailed data sets than 
bilateral comparisons.
4  
3  Equity Trading on Euronext Paris and Xetra 
The two trading systems share many similarities. Most importantly, they are both anonymous 
electronic open limit order books. However, closer inspection reveals that there are a number 
of potentially important differences. In this section we give a short description of both trading 
systems. It is complemented by the more detailed information given in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Euronext is the result of a merger between the exchanges in France, the Netherlands, and Bel-
gium. The trading system goes back to the Cotation Assisté en Continue (CAC) system intro-
duced in 1986, later renamed Nouvelle Systeme de Cotation (NSC). After the merger in 2001, 
several changes were implemented to harmonize the trading protocols on the three markets. 
Liquid stocks are traded continuously from 09.00 to 17.25 , with call auctions at the open and 
close of trading. The market is fully transparent, with the exception of the hidden part of “ice-
berg orders”. Only a fraction of the volume of these orders (the “peak”) is visible on the 
screen. After execution of the peak, the next, equally-sized, part of the order becomes visi-
ble.
5 Crosses and block trades may be negotiated outside the system. The admissible prices 
for these transactions are restricted by the status of the order book. Reporting requirements 
assure that they are funnelled through the system.  
                                                 
4  Domowitz et al. (2000) use data provided by Elkins, McSherry Co., Inc., an advisory firm. Costs are meas-
ured by relating the prices realized in institutional equity trades to a benchmark which is constructed as the 
average of the daily high, low, opening and closing prices. Both Jain (2001) and London Economics (2002) 
base their analysis on daily closing bid and ask prices obtained from Bloomberg.  
5  When the total order is not a multiple of the peak volume, the last part is smaller than the preceding parts. A 
further characteristic of the iceberg orders is that each portion is attached the time stamp of the moment when 
it becomes visible. The hidden parts therefore lose time priority.    7
For some less liquid stocks, liquidity providers stand ready to increase the liquidity. They 
have to commit to posting firm two-way quotes. The definition of maximum spreads and 
minimum depths is part of the agreement with Euronext. Volatility interruptions are triggered 
when the potential transaction price would lie outside a pre-defined range around a reference 
price.  
The trading system Xetra was introduced in November 1997 and replaced the electronic trad-
ing system IBIS. Liquid stocks are traded continuously from 09.00 to 20.00 with call auctions 
at the open, the close, and two intradaily call auctions. The market is fully transparent, again 
with the exception of the hidden part of iceberg orders. Block trades may be negotiated out-
side the system. In this case, they are not reported as transactions in Xetra. Deutsche Börse 
AG also offers a block trading facility (Xetra XXL), an anonymous matching system with 
closed order book.  
Designated sponsors (similar to the Euronext liquidity providers) stand ready to increase the 
liquidity for less liquid stocks. Finally, as in Euronext, volatility interruptions are triggered 
when a potential transaction price lies outside of a pre-determined interval.  
Despite many similarities, there also differences between the trading systems. These concern 
the trading hours, the existence of intradaily call auctions, and the rule for cross and block 
trades alluded to above. Another potentially important point is that Xetra faces competition by 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (a floor-based exchange with a trading system similar to that of 
the NYSE) and several small regional exchanges.  
There are many more designated sponsors in Xetra than there are liquidity providers in Euro-
next. This holds both with respect to the number of stocks with a sponsoring or liquidity pro-
vision agreement and the number of sponsors or liquidity providers per stock. The require-
ments for the designated sponsors in Xetra are defined by Deutsche Börse AG for groups of   8
                                                
stocks. They are thus not subject to negotiation. Further, Deutsche Börse AG performs rank-
ings of the sponsors and publishes the results in quarterly intervals. Euronext, on the other 
hand, does not specify the requirements for the liquidity providers to the same extent. Regular 
rankings are performed, but are not published.
6  
The price limits that trigger a volatility interruption are known to Euronext market partici-
pants. The respective limits are not known to traders in Xetra. Therefore, Xetra market par-
ticipants are uncertain about whether a certain order will trigger a trading halt or not.  
The minimum tick size is different between the two markets. It is always €0.01 in Xetra.
7 In 
Euronext, on the other hand, it is €0.01 only for stocks trading at prices below €50. It in-
creases to €0.05 for stocks with prices above €50, to €0.1 for stocks with prices above €100, 
and to €0.5 for stocks with prices above €500.  
4  Data and Methodology 
The data for our empirical analysis was provided by the exchanges. Both Deutsche Börse AG 
and Euronext provide CD-ROMs containing time-stamped data on bid and ask prices, transac-
tion prices and trading volumes. Our sample covers the three months (65 trading days), May, 
June and July 2002.
8  
Using these data sets we create matched samples of 40 pairs of stocks where each pair con-
sists of one French stock traded on Euronext Paris and one German stock traded in Xetra. We 
start by defining an initial sample of stocks from which the pairs are to be drawn.
9 For 
 
6  Euronext does, however, publish average spread and depth figures for instruments. This allows inferences 
about the performance of the liquidity providers.  
7  There is an exception for stocks trading at prices below €0.1, a case which is irrelevant in our sample.  
8  We screened the data set for errors by applying a set of filters. Quotes were deleted from the sample when 
either the bid or the ask price was non-positive, when the spread was negative, when the percentage quoted 
spread exceeded 10%, and when a quoted price involved a price change since the previous quote of more 
than 10%.  
9  We exclude stocks that are not traded continuously. This is the case for some less liquid stocks.  France, we choose the SFB 250, an index comprising the 250 largest stocks. For Germany we 
choose all constituent stocks of the DAX, the MDAX and the SDAX indices. Taken together, 
these indices comprise the 200 largest stocks.  
The matched stocks should be as similar as possible with respect to those characteristics that 
determine the liquidity. Following the literature (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1996; Bessembinder 
and Kauffman, 1997; Venkataraman, 2001) we match on market capitalization, trading vol-
ume, price level and volatility. Market capitalization, trading volume and the price level are 
calculated as daily averages over the sample period. Return volatility is the standard deviation 
of daily returns over the sample period.  
One problem complicates the matching procedure. The turnover velocity (defined as the ratio 
of euro volume and market capitalization) is markedly different in the two markets. In our 
initial sample described above, the turnover velocity is 47.7% for the French stocks and 
69.8% for the German stocks (unweighted averages over the stocks). Consequently, matching 
on both criteria simultaneously yields poor results and may be inappropriate. Therefore we 
use a two-step procedure. In a first step we require that the relative difference in market capi-
talization, MC, does not exceed the threshold defined by  
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where the superscript (XETRA and EURP) relates to the market. This condition puts an upper 
bound on the difference in market capitalization. From the universe of all pairs of stock satis-
fying condition (1) we construct two matched samples. Matching criteria for the first sample 
are market capitalization, price and volatility. The criteria for the second sample are trading 
volume, price and volatility. In both cases the matching is performed by calculating the score  
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where the  i x ,  , correspond to the respective matching criteria. We then identify the 
best matching French stock (i.e., the one that yields the lowest score) for each of the German 
stocks and finally we select the 40 pairs with the lowest score for our final sample.  
1, 2, 3 i =
As noted in section 3, trading hours in Xetra are longer than those in Euronext. After the 
17.30 auction, trading activity in Xetra slows down considerably.
10 The main reason is that 
many institutional investors close their books at 7.30 Deutsche Börse AG has, subsequent to 
our sample period, shortened trading hours. The closing auction now takes place at 17.30, 
almost simultaneously with the closing auction in Euronext. In order not to let the different 
trading hours affect our results we restrict the analysis to those hours where both markets are 
open. Our analysis only considers data from the continuous trading sessions. We thus elimi-
nate the data from the call auctions. The original data from Euronext Paris contains block 
trades (applications) whereas the Xetra data does not. We therefore exclude the block trades 
from our Euronext sample.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the two samples resulting from our matching proce-
dure. It also shows disaggregated results for quartiles sorted by market capitalization. Overall, 
the French and German stocks are reasonably similar with respect to market capitalization and 
price. Differences in volatility are small in magnitude but tend to be systematic. Return vola-
tility for the German subsamples is lower overall and in all but one of the quartiles. The trad-
ing volume is similar only in the sample where it is used as a matching criterion. In the sam-
ple matched on market capitalization, the trading volume of the German stocks is markedly 
                                                 
10  Both the number of trades per hour and the trading volume per hour are about five times as large between 
09.00  and 17.30  than they are between 17.30 and 20.00. 
  10higher than the corresponding value for the French stocks. This is a consequence of the higher 
turnover velocity in Germany.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Although the matching procedure arguably identified pairs of stocks that are reasonably simi-
lar, the remaining differences are large enough to potentially have an impact on liquidity. As a 
consequence, we will have to check whether any differences in liquidity that we may find are 
caused by a lack of control for relevant firm characteristics.  
5  Results 
Our first measure of market quality is the percentage quoted half spread, defined as 
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where a, b and m are the ask price, the bid price and the quote midpoint, respectively. The 
indices i and t denote the stock and time. We calculate a time-weighted average quoted half 
spread for each stock and each trading day.
11 These daily averages are then used for the 
analysis. This procedure assures that each stock, irrespective of its trading volume, and each 
trading day, irrespective of the trading activity on that particular day, receive the same weight 
in the analysis.  
Results are shown in Panel A of Table 3. The average quoted half spread in France is 0.55% 
in the sample matched on market capitalization and 0.58% in the sample matched on volume. 
The corresponding figures for Germany are 0.45% and 0.50%, respectively. The differences 
are significant in both cases, indicating that quoted spreads in Xetra are lower on average. 
Considering the median rather than the mean yields similar results.  
  11We next sort the sample stocks into four groups according to their market capitalization. The 
results are also shown in Panel A of Table 3. The result that quoted spreads in Xetra are lower 
than those in Euronext holds, with only two exceptions (the mean in the second group in the 
sample matched on market capitalization and the median in the fourth group in the sample 
matched on volume), through all groups.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Transactions tend to cluster in periods in which spreads are low. Consequently, average effec-
tive spreads, which relate the transaction price to the quote midpoint in effect prior to the 
transaction, are expected to be lower than quoted spreads. The percentage effective half 
spread is defined as  
  100
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=  (4) 
Results for the effective half spread are shown in Panel B of Table 3. They are unanimously 
lower than the quoted spreads shown in Panel A. Effective half spreads in Xetra are, on aver-
age, 0.34% in the sample matched on market capitalization and 0.37% in the sample matched 
on volume. This is significantly less than the corresponding values of 0.434% and 0.427% we 
find for Euronext Paris. Results for the size groups confirm this finding. Effective spreads in 
Xetra are lower than those in Euronext with only one exception (the median in the fourth 
group in the sample matched on volume).  
The results thus far suggest that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in Xetra. One 
way to gain further insights into the reasons for this pattern is to decompose the spread into its 
components. We follow the procedure used by Venkataraman (2001). The effective half 
                                                                                                                                                          
11  Using equally-weighted averages instead of time-weighted averages yields similar results.  
  12spread is decomposed into an adverse selection component (or price impact) s
a and the real-
ized half spread s
r. The latter has to cover order processing costs and contains any rents the 
suppliers of liquidity may earn. The two measures are defined as  
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where Di,t is a trade indicator variable (1 for a buyer-initiated trade, -1 for a seller-initiated 
trade).
12 The adverse selection component captures the price impact of a trade by measuring 
the change of the quote midpoint between the time of the transaction, t, and the midpoint at 
time t+τ. The latter serves as a proxy for the true value of the stock at time t+τ. We choose a 
value of 5 minutes for τ.
13 The realized half spread captures the revenue of the suppliers of 
liquidity net of losses to informed traders by relating the transaction price to the midpoint at 
time t+τ.  
The results are shown in Table 4. No clear pattern emerges for the adverse selection compo-
nent. In the sample matched on market capitalization the difference in the adverse selection 
component is insignificant in the full sample while results for the size groups are mixed. In 
the sample matched on volume the adverse selection component is significantly smaller in the 
French market. Results for the size groups are again inconclusive. From this it can be con-
cluded that differences in the adverse selection component do not explain the differences in 
spreads documented in Table 3.  
Realized half spreads (shown in Panel B of Table 4) are significantly lower in Xetra. On aver-
age, realized spreads amount to 0.12% and 0.14% in Xetra as compared to 0.23% and 0.24% 
                                                 
12  A transaction is classified as buyer-initiated [seller-initiated] if the price is above [below] the quote midpoint.  
  13in Euronext. This pattern holds through all size groups and irrespective of whether the mean 
or the median is considered. The result that realized spreads are rather high in the French 
market is consistent with Venkataraman (2001).  
Insert  about here 
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 indicate that the matching procedure does not re-
sult in pairs of stocks that are equal with respect to all relevant variables. It is thus possible 
that the differences in spreads documented above are a consequence of different stock charac-
teristics. To control for these effects we regress the difference in execution costs on the resid-
ual differences in a set of control variables. These are the log of market capitalization, the log 
of the price level, return volatility, the log of the number of transactions and the log of the 
average trade size. The model is  
  () () ( )( ) 01 2 3 4 5
j
i,t i i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t s ln MC ln P ln Notrans ln Trdsize ΔΔ ΔΔ Δ Δ =γ +γ +γ +γ σ +γ +γ +ε (5) 
where 
j
i,t s Δ :  Difference in execution cost measure between French stock i and the 
matched German stock on day t.  j q,e,a,r ∈  denotes the measure of execu-
tion costs (quoted and effective spread, adverse selection component and re-
alized spread)  
() i ln MC Δ :  Difference in the log of market capitalization between French stock i and 
the matched German stock  
                                                                                                                                                          
13  Previous research (e.g. Huang and Stoll, 1996) implies that the results are insensitive to the choice of τ.  
  14() i,t ln P Δ :  Difference in the log of the price level between French stock i and the 
matched German stock.  i P  is the average transaction price of stock i on day 
t.  
i,t σ Δ :  Difference in return volatility between French stock i and the matched Ger-
man stock. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of midquote re-
turns for stock i on day t.  
( ) i,t ln Notrans Δ : Difference in the log of the number of transactions on day t between French 
stock i and the matched German stock.  
( i,t ln Trdsize Δ ) :  Difference in the log of the average trade size (measured in €) on day t be-
tween French stock i and the matched German stock.  
Table 5 shows the results of GMM estimation. The independent variables have explanatory 
power in all regressions (although the R
2 in the realized spread regression is rather low). This 
indicates that the matching procedure did not result in a perfectly matched sample. The differ-
ence between the quoted and effective spreads in Euronext and Xetra is significantly nega-
tively related to the number of transactions, the average transaction size, the price level and 
market capitalization (although the coefficients of this variable are only significant in the 
sample matched on market capitalization). Spread differences are positively related to differ-
ences in volatility. 
Differences in the adverse selection components are negatively related to differences in the 
price level and are positively related to differences in volatility and (in the sample matched on 
volume) also to differences in average trade size. Differences in realized spreads are nega-
tively related to differences in the volume variables (number of trades and average trade size), 
market capitalization and the price level.  
  15  16
If the explanatory variables explained the differences in the spread measures the constants 
should be zero. We find, however, that the constants in the quoted, effective and realized 
spread regressions are significantly positive. This indicates that spreads in Euronext are 
higher even after controlling for residual differences in market capitalization, price level, 
volatility and volume. The intercepts in the adverse selection component regression are insig-
nificant. Thus, the higher spreads in Euronext are not explained by differences in the adverse 
selection component. Rather, the spread differences appear to be driven by differences in real-
ized spreads.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
6  Explaining the differences in the components of the spread  
Our results thus far indicate that spreads in Euronext are significantly higher than those in 
Xetra, and that these differences are driven by differences in the realized spreads. These dif-
ferences may be due to the competitive environment or to the organization of the trading sys-
tem.  
We first turn to explanations based on differences in the trading systems.
14 As outlined in 
section 3, and despite the similarity on a "macro level", there remain important differences in 
the way trading is organized on the two exchanges. We consider two differences that poten-
tially have an impact on execution costs.  
First, minimum tick sizes are different in Euronext and Xetra. The tick size is €0.01 for all 
stocks (except those trading at prices below €0.10) in Xetra. In Euronext, on the other hand, 
the minimum tick size is €0.01 for stocks trading at prices below €50, €0.05 for stocks trading 
at prices between €50 and €100, €0.10 for stocks trading at prices between €100 and €500, and €0.50 for stocks trading at prices above €500. As smaller tick sizes have been reported to 
be associated with lower spreads (e.g., Ronen and Weaver, 2001), the larger minimum tick 
size is a possible explanation for the larger realized spreads in Euronext.  
Second, most stocks in Xetra (outside the DAX 30 index) have one or more designated spon-
sors. In Euronext, the number of stocks with a liquidity supplier is significantly lower. To the 
extent that the existence of a liquidity provision agreement (i.e., the existence of a sponsor or 
liquidity provider) increases liquidity, this may be another explanation for the higher realized 
spreads in Euronext.  
In order to control for the effect of these variables we include them as additional explanatory 
variables in regression (5). The augmented model is  
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ΔΔ ΔΔ Δ
ΔΔ
=γ +γ +γ +γ σ +γ
+γ +γ +γ +ε
 (6) 
where  
LPi:  Dummy variable which takes on the value one when the German stock i has 
a designated sponsor and its French counterpart does not have a liquidity 
provider.
15  
i,t Reltick Δ :  The difference in the relative tick size on day t between French stock i and 
the matched German stock. The relative tick size is the tick size (1 cent for 
                                                                                                                                                          
14  The analysis in this section is related to previous research investigating into the impact of stock exchange 
reforms on market quality, e.g. Majnoni and Massa (2001).  
15  There are three cases (two in the sample matched on market capitalization and one in the sample matched on 
volume) where the opposite occurs, i.e., there is a liquidity provider in Euronext but no designated sponsor in 
Xetra. Including an additional dummy variable capturing these cases does not change the results.  
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all German stocks, 1, 5 or 10 cents
16 for the French stocks) divided by the 
price level of the stock.  
All other variables are as defined previously. We expect a positive sign for the two additional 
variables in the quoted, effective and realized spread regressions. The difference between the 
spread measure for the French stock and its German counterpart should be larger when only 
the German stock has a liquidity provision agreement, or when the tick size of the French 
stock is larger.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
The results are shown in Table 6. Comparing them to those reported in Table 5 reveals that 
the additional variables do not have much additional explanatory power, as is evidenced by 
only slightly increased R
2s. The dummy variable for the liquidity provision agreements is 
insignificant. This indicates that the presence of a liquidity provider does not have a signifi-
cant impact on liquidity. The coefficient on the tick size variable is, contrary to our expecta-
tions, significantly negative, implying that stocks with larger relative tick size have lower, 
rather than higher, spreads.
17  
The constants are still significantly positive for the quoted, effective and realized spread and 
are insignificant for the adverse selection component. This implies that neither differences in 
the tick size nor differences in the frequency of liquidity provision agreements explain the 
spread differences between Xetra and Euronext.  
                                                 
16  Our sample does not contain stocks with prices above €500. Consequently, there are no French stocks with a 
tick size of 50 cents.  
17  We estimated an alternative specification where we replaced the relative tick size variable by two dummy 
variables which take on the value 1 for those French stocks with a minimum tick size of €0.05 and €0.10, re-
spectively. The coefficients of the dummy variables are significantly negative. We do not have a good expla-
nation for the negative coefficients of the tick size variables in both specifications.  Another important difference between the French and the German equity market is the degree 
of domestic competition for order flow. Whereas there is no domestic competitor for Euron-
ext, Xetra faces competition by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and several regional exchanges. 
Notwithstanding the existence of competing trading venues, Xetra attains market shares ex-
ceeding 90% for most DAX stocks. For less liquid stocks, however, Xetra market shares are 
much lower.
18 We use the Xetra market share as a proxy for the degree of domestic competi-
tion for order flow. The lower the market share the more intense the competition.  
There is one potential problem here. The Xetra market share is lower for less liquid stocks. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that Xetra enjoys a larger transaction cost advantage for less 
liquid stocks. Consequently, the market share variable may simply be picking up a firm size 
effect.
19 Therefore, we control for firm size by including the average market capitalization of 
each pair of firms as an additional explanatory variable. This yields the model  
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(7) 
where 
Xetra
i MS :  Xetra market share for German stock i.
20  
, ln( ) it MC :  the log of the average market capitalization of the stock pair i 
There is no clear prediction as to the sign of the market share coefficient. On the one hand, 
higher Xetra market share implies less competition and, consequently, might lead to higher 
spreads. The difference between spreads in Euronext and those in Xetra (our dependent vari-
                                                 
18  The observation that  Xetra market share is increasing in the liquidity of the stock is corroborated by high 
correlations between the Xetra market share on the one hand and market capitalization, trading volume and 
the number of transactions on the other hand.  
19  We thank the anonymous referee for directing our attention to this point.  
  19able) should then be smaller for stocks with a high Xetra market share. In this case we would 
expect a negative coefficient. On the other hand, however, higher Xetra market share implies 
that liquidity is concentrated in one market place. This may lead to lower spreads in Xetra 
and, by implication, we should expect a positive coefficient in this case.  
We expect a negative coefficient on the average market capitalization as spread differences 
are, as documeted in Table 3, larger for smaller firms. The results are shown in Table 7. Com-
parison with those in Table 5 and Table 6 reveals that most coefficients retain their sign and 
significance. A notable exception is the tick size variable which loses significance in all but 
one case. The firm size measure  , ln( ) it MC  enters significantly, with the coefficient being 
negative in the quoted, effective and realized spread regressions and positive in the adverse 
selection component regression. The coefficient on the market share variable is predomi-
nantly negative but is significant in only one case. This implies that, after controlling for firm 
size, the Xetra market share does not explain the differences in transaction costs.
21  
Insert Table 7 about here  
In summary we find that, although the variables employed to capture differences in the trad-
ing systems and in the competitive environment do have explanatory power, they do not fully 
explain the differences in transaction costs between Xetra and Euronext.  
                                                                                                                                                          
20  The market shares are taken from the monthly Kassamarktstatistik published by Deutsche Börse AG. We use 
the average of the market shares for May, June and July 2002.  
21  Battalio et al. (1997) find that spreads on the New York Stock Exchange are hardly affected by competitive 
pressure from the regional exchanges in Boston and Cincinnati. This result is consistent with ours, as we find 
that spreads in Xetra (measured relative to those in Euronext) are not affected by competitive pressure from 
the regional exchanges. Other papers analyzing the impact of competition on market quality include Taylor 
(2002) and Gresse (2006).  
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7  Summary and Conclusions 
In the present paper we compare execution costs in Euronext Paris to those in Xetra. Both are 
anonymous electronic limit order books. Though the two systems are similar, there are differ-
ences in detail. For example, minimum tick sizes and the degree to which designated market 
makers are involved in the trading process are different.  
To control for different stock characteristics, we construct two matched samples of 40 pairs of 
stocks. The matching criteria are market capitalization, price level and return volatility for the 
first sample and trading volume, price level and volatility for the second sample. Results for 
both samples are similar. This indicates that the results are robust to the details of the match-
ing procedure.  
We use these samples to compare quoted and effective spreads, the adverse selection compo-
nent of the spread, and the realized spread. Spreads generally tend to be lower in Xetra. This 
general finding is consistent with the results reported in Ellul (2002) who analyzes the prede-
cessors of the current trading systems, i.e., IBIS and CAC.  
Considering the components of the spread we find that there are no significant differences in 
adverse selection costs. The higher spreads in Euronext are thus due to high realized spreads. 
This result is consistent with Venkataraman (2001) who also documented that realized 
spreads in the French market are high.  
We use a set of regressions to analyze whether these results are explained by differences in 
stock characteristics not eliminated by our matching procedure. The results of the regression 
analysis confirm the finding that execution costs are lower in Xetra. In an attempt to explain 
these differences we control for the differing number of liquidity provision agreements and 
differences in minimum tick size. Neither characteristic do not fully explains the larger execu-
tion costs in Euronext. The same is true for the degree of domestic competition for order flow   22
in Germany. The question why realized spreads in Euronext are so high thus remains an open 
issue.    23
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 Table 1: The Trading Systems 
  Xetra Euronext 
Nature of trading system  •  Electronic open limit order book  •  Electronic open limit order book 
Trading mechanism by stock 
groups 
•  Liquid stocks: call auctions (open, intradaily, close) and con-
tinuous trading 
•  Illiquid stocks: call auction  
•  Liquid stocks: call auctions (open, close) and continuous trad-
ing 
•  Less liquid stocks: two call auctions 
•  Least liquid stocks: one call auction 
Call auctions  •  Pre-trading phase with closed book, allows entry and modifica-
tion of orders 
•  Indicative prices are disseminated 
•  Order imbalance information provided for DAX stocks and 
stocks with designated sponsors (see below) 
•  Price determination based on volume maximization, order im-
balance, reference price 
•  Random price determination time 
•  Pre-trading phase with partially open (5 best bid and ask prices 
and the respective quantities are given) book. allows entry and 
modification of orders 
•  Indicative prices are disseminated 
•  Price determination based on volume maximization, order im-
balance, reference price 
•  Random price determination time 
Admissible order types  •  Market, limit, market-to-limit, stop orders  
•  Additional execution conditions admissible: immediate-or-
cancel, fill-or-kill  
•  Validity constraints: good-for-day, good-till-date, good-till-
cancelled (maximum validity 90 days)  
•  Admissible trading restrictions, e.g. auction only, opening only 
•  Iceberg orders: specify overall volume and peak volume; ice-
berg orders are not identified in the book; time stamp equal to 
time at which peak appears on the screen  
•  Market, Must-be-filled (the latter must be fully executed, only 
one of these typed is admissible for a given instrument), limit, 
market-to-limit, stop orders  
•  Additional execution conditions admissible: fill-and-kill, all-or-
none, minimum quantity (with fill-or-kill as special case)  
•  Validity constraints: good-for-day, good-till-date, good-till 
cancelled (maximum validity 365 days)  
•  Iceberg orders: specify overall volume and peak volume; ice-
berg orders are not identified in the book; time stamp equal to 
time at which peak appears on the screen  
•  Cross trades and block trades negotiated outside, but funnelled 
through the system (and subject to price restrictions!) 
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  Xetra Euronext 
Trading hours  •  08.50 (beginning opening auction) to 20.05  (end closing auc-
tion) 
•  Stocks traded by call auction only: 13.20 - 13.25  
•  Xetra XXL (block trading facility): crossings each 15 minutes 
from 09.30  to 18.00  
•  Pre-opening 07.15 
•  Trading from 09.00  to 17.25 , closing auction at 17.30  
•  Stocks traded by call auction only: 15.00  for those with a single 
call, 10.30 and 16.00 for those with two calls  
Priority rules  •  Price, time (except hidden parts of iceberg orders)  •  Price, time (except hidden parts of iceberg orders) 
Transparency in continuous 
trading session  
•  open book  
•  Exception 1: hidden parts of iceberg orders  
•  Exception 2: liquidity provided by designated sponsors upon 
quote request  
•  Open book  
•  Exception: hidden parts of iceberg orders  
Anonymity  •  Anonymous  
•  Exception: designated sponsors know identity of quote request-
ing party  
•  Anonymous (since 2001; before: broker IDs appeared on the 
screen) 
Clearing settlement  •  Settlement two workingdays after transaction 
•  Central counterparty to be introduced in 2003 
•  Same-day settlement (in addition, "service de règlement dif-
ferée" allows delayed settlement, but the delay is only effective 
in the relation between broker and customer) 
•  Clearnet SA. acts as central counterparty 
Minimum tick size  •  €0.01 
•  €0.001 for instruments with prices below € 0.1 
•  €0.01 if price < €50  
•  €0.05 if €50  ≤ price < €100  
•  €0.10 if €100  ≤ price < €500  
•   €0.50 if price > €500  
Minimum order size  •  1 share   •  1 share 
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  Xetra Euronext 
Designated sponsors, liquidity 
providers 
•  Mandatory for Neuer Markt (2), SMAX (2) and for admission 
to the MDAX (midcap) index 
•  Must participate in auctions and volatility interruptions 
•  Minimum quote quantities, maximum spreads (differentiated 
according to liquidity) and maximum response time specified 
•  Regular performance measurement, published quarterly  
•  Privileges: reduced fees, designated sponsors learn identity of 
quote-requesting trader 
•  Not allowed for Euronext 100 stocks 
•  Voluntary for all stocks that qualify for continuous trading and 
for all stocks traded by call auction only 
•  Mandatory for stocks that the issuer wishes to be traded con-
tinuously although the requirements are not met  
•  Recommended (but not mandatory) for small caps 
•  Types: permanent liquidity provider, volatility liquidity pro-
vider (all auctions, including those resulting from circuit break-
ers); auction liquidity provider (for issues traded in auction 
only)  
•  Liquidity provider is appointed by Euronext 
•  Liquidity provider has to commit to specific size and spread, 
these must "to the opinion of Euronext have added value for the 
liquidity and the quality of market in such instrument" (rule 
1.2.3) 
•  Size and spreads for each instrument (not each liquidity pro-
vider) are published every six months 
•  Monitoring of performance of liquidity providers at least twice 
a year, but rating are not published  
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  Xetra Euronext 
Domestic parallel trading venues  •  Floor trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and seven re-
gional exchanges 
•  OTC trading  
•  Since September 2002 (after our sample period): Internalization 
of orders through XetraBest  
•  No  
Circuit breakers  •  Volatility interruption if potential price outside pre-defined 
range around reference price 1 (the last determined price) or 
reference price 2 (last auction price) 
•  The width of the ranges are not disclosed to market participants 
and are adapted to market conditions 
•  Market order interruption: when market orders exist that are not 
executable  
•  Trading resumes with call auction 
•  Exchange can suspend trading in case of information events; 
orders in the system are deleted 
•  Volatility interruption if potential price outside pre-defined 
range around static reference price (in general the opening 
price) or dynamic reference price (in general the last traded 
price)  
•  Static price range +/- 10%, dynamic price range +/- 2% or +/- 
5%, depending on instrument group 
•  Trading resumes with call auction 
•  Exchange can suspend trading in case of corporate events; or-
ders in the system are deleted 
Handling of block trades  •  Specific block trading segment (Xetra XXL)  
•  Matching of orders at the Xetra quote midpoint (i.e., Xetra XXL 
itself does not contribute to price discovery)  
•  Anonymous, closed order book  
•  Negotiated outside the order book  
•  In general, price constraints resulting from the status of the 
book apply  
•  Trades are reported to Euronext and published there  
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Table 2: Sample Description 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and for sub-samples formed according to market capi-
talization (using the average market capitalization of the pairs as sorting criterion). Market capitalization, trading 
volume and price level are measured as daily averages over the sample period. Return volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the sample period.  
 
    Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
   cap.   
(€ mio.) 
volume 
(€ mio.) 
volatil-
ity 
price cap.   
(€ mio.) 
volume 
(€ mio.) 
volatil-
ity 
price 
FRA 6,956.2  812,501 0.0274  35.38  4965.7  429,259 0.0273  31.40  full 
sample GER  6,876.9  504,938  0.0263  34.46 4273.0  449,336  0.0254 29.84 
FRA 24,630.1 3,090,713  0.0273  45.16  17188.0 1,551,317 0.0256  45.29 
1st 
GER 24,275.0 1,862,368 0.0261  44.90  14703.4 1,617,901 0.0247  43.55 
FRA 2,458.4  121,570 0.0264  31.73  2100.8  150,413 0.0321  32.4 
2nd 
GER 2,476.5  131,937 0.0249  31.65  1897.2  165,031 0.0293  30.5 
FRA 623.9  32,565  0.0270  37.34  456.1  12,579 0.0256  27.9 
3rd 
GER 637.9  22,259 0.0275  33.18  359.5  11,553 0.0246  27.2 
FRA 112.4  5,157 0.0287  27.29  118.0  2,727  0.0260  20.0 
4th 
GER 118.3  3,186 0.0265  28.12  131.9  2,8589 0.0232  18.10 
Panel B: The sample stocks 
  Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
 France  Germany  France  Germany 
1st  Sanofi-Aventis, BNP Paribas, 
L'Oreal. LVMH, Renault, 
EADS, Schneider, Bouygues, 
AGF Assurance Generale, 
Arcelor 
Siemens, DaimlerChrysler, 
Deutsche Bank., BMW, Volks-
wagen, Deutsche Post, Schering, 
Metro., Altana., ThyssenKrupp 
BNP Paribas, Carrefour, 
LVMH, Peugeot, EADS , 
Bouygues, AGF Assurance 
Generale, Arcelor, Pernod-
Ricard, Essilor. 
DaimlerChrysler, BMW, 
Volkswagen, Schering, Com-
merzbank, Metro, Altana, 
ThyssenKrupp, Henkel, 
Deutsche Boerse 
2nd  Essilor, Valeo, M6-Metropole 
TV, Air France-KLM, Euro-
next, Remy Cointreau, NRJ 
Group, Clarins, SCOR, Zodiac 
Deutsche Börse, Heidelberger 
Druckmaschinen, Karstadt 
Quelle, Continental, MAN, 
Fraport, Hochtief, Wella, Cela-
nese, Merck 
Dassault Systemes, Altran 
Tech., BIC, Euronext, Remy 
Cointreau, NRJ Group, Zodi-
ac, Euler Hermes, Fimalac, 
Ingenico 
Epcos, MLP, Heidelberger 
Druckmaschinen, Continental, 
Fraport, Hochtief, Merck, 
Fielmann, Stada, Jenoptik 
3rd  Neopost, Rodriguez Group, 
Teleperformance, Ingenico, 
Vallourec, Cegedim, Union 
Financiere, Nexans, Carbone-
Lorraine, Orpea 
AVA, Puma, Jenoptik, Hugo 
Boss, Mannheimer, Beru, GfK, 
SGL Carbon, Tecis Holding, 
Dyckerhoff 
Beneteau, Generale de Sante, 
April Group, Nexans, Compa-
gnie Generale de Geophysi-
que, Hyparlo, Norbert Den-
tressangle, Kaufman et Broad, 
Carbone-Lorraine, Groupe 
Sterica 
Beru, IWKA, Dyckerhoff, SGL 
Carbon, Rhoen-Klinikum, 
Hornbach Baumarkt, DIS, 
Koenig + Bauer, Zapf Creation, 
Wedeco 
4th  Etam Developpement, Gifi, 
Inter Parfums, Laurent Perrier, 
Cegid, Flo (Groupe), Groupe 
Open, Lucia, Maison France 
Confort, Toupargel Agrigel 
Wedeco, Loewe, Krones, Zapf 
Creation, Fuchs Petrolub, Esca-
da, Cundomi, A.S.Creation, 
Gaphit Kropfmuehl, STO 
Haulotte Group, Fleury Mi-
chon, Rubis, Ales Groupe, 
Bail Investissement Fonciere, 
Maison France Confort, SII, 
Lucia, Toupargel Agrigel, CS 
Communication & Systems 
Gerry Weber International, 
Derr, Edscha, Loewe, Condo-
mi, Escada, STO, Biotest, A.S. 
Creation, Graphit Kropfmuehl Table 3: Comparison of Bid-Ask Spreads 
Panel A: Quoted Half Spreads - Time-Weighted 
This panel shows average quoted half spreads for the sample stocks. The quoted half spread is defined as  
100
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−
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We calculate an average quoted half spread for each stock and each trading days. The figures in the table are 
based on these daily averages. The first line shows mean and median values for the full sample. Lines 2 through 
4 report values for three groups of stocks sorted by market capitalization. The test statistics are for a t-test for the 
equality of the means and a Wilcoxon test for the equality of the medians, respectively.  
    Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
   FRA  GER  test  statis-
tic 
FRA GER  test  statis-
tic 
mean  0.5461  0.4540 5.29 0.5789  0.5005 4.33 
full sample 
median  0.2817  0.2428 5.53 0.3188  0.3114 3.02 
mean  0.0893  0.0709 9.38 0.0922  0.0804 8.12 
1st  median  0.0800  0.0607 11.28 0.0864  0.0714  9.31 
mean  0.2980  0.3249 1.39 0.3587  0.2698 7.07 
2nd  median  0.2306  0.1875 5.45 0.2778  0.2207 5.58 
mean  0.5251  0.4480 3.52 0.6728  0.5841 3.56 
3rd  median  0.3689  0.3491 1.87 0.5261  0.4972 2.18 
mean  1.3057  0.9962 6.72 1.2209  1.1016 2.30 
4th  median  1.1026  0.8077 7.62 0.9181  0.9408 0.13 
Panel B: Effective Half Spreads 
This panel shows average effective half spreads for the sample stocks. The effective half spread is defined as  
100
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The procedures and the structure of the table are as in Panel A.  
 
    Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
   FRA  GER  test  statis-
tic 
FRA GER  test  statis-
tic 
mean  0.4335  0.3373 6.92 0.4273  0.3737 3.97 
full sample 
median  0.2447  0.1867 7.28 0.2694  0.2314 3.61 
mean  0.0807  0.0688 6.84 0.0887  0.0752 6.55 
1st 
median  0.0722  0.0603 9.84 0.0772  0.0658 8.53 
mean  0.2619  0.2521 0.62 0.3253  0.2487 6.46 
2nd 
median  0.2195  0.1521 7.69 0.2533  0.2023 6.01 
mean  0.5080  0.3906 5.22 0.5634  0.4780 4.17 
3rd 
median  0.3703  0.3100 1.08 0.4516  0.4157 3.27 
mean  1.0780  0.7702 7.67 0.9200  0.8841 0.77 
4th 
median  0.9181  0.6570 7.85 0.6561  0.7756 2.25 
  31Table 4: The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Panel A: Adverse-Selection Component 
This panel shows the adverse selection component of the spread for the sample stocks. The effective half spread 
is decomposed into an adverse selection component (or price impact) s
a and the realized half spread s
r. The two 
measures are defined as  
( ) ( )
100 100
i,t i,t i,t i,t ar
i , ti , t i , ti , t
i,t i,t
mm p m
sD , sD
mm
+τ+ −−
=⋅⋅ =⋅⋅
τ  
where Di,t is a trade indicator variable (1 for a buyer-initiated trade, -1 for a seller-initiated trade). The adverse 
selection component captures the price impact of a trade by measuring the change of the quote midpoint between 
the time of the transaction, t, and the midpoint at time t+τ. The latter serves as a proxy for the true value of the 
stock at time t+τ. We choose a value of 5 minutes for τ. The first line of the table shows mean and median val-
ues for the full sample. Lines 2 through 4 report values for three groups of stocks sorted by market capitaliza-
tion. The test statistics are for a t-test for the equality of the means and a Wilcoxon test for the equality of the 
medians, respectively.  
    Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
   FRA  GER  test  statis-
tic 
FRA GER  test  statis-
tic 
mean  0.1987  0.2139 1.50 0.1899  0.2316 4.26 
full sample 
median  0.1042  0.0971 1.21 0.1067  0.1207 4.16 
mean  0.0708  0.0625 4.14 0.0722  0.0669 2.47 
1st 
median  0.0625  0.0536 4.55 0.0632  0.0572 2.33 
mean  0.1414  0.1754 2.59 0.1638  0.1672 0.42 
2nd 
median  0.1113  0.0937 2.26 0.1303  0.1285 0.34 
mean  0.2417  0.2289 0.77 0.2334  0.2944 3.38 
3rd 
median  0.1486  0.1597 0.24 0.1502  0.2287 5.28 
mean  0.4050  0.4638 1.54 0.3518  0.4987 3.59 
4th 
median  0.2654  0.3195 2.77 0.1835  0.3451 4.95 
Panel B: Realized Half Spreads 
This panel shows the realized half spread for the sample stocks. See the legend for Panel A for details.  
 
    Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
   FRA  GER  test  statis-
tic 
FRA GER  test  statis-
tic 
mean  0.2348  0.1235 9.36 0.2374  0.1421 8.06 
full sample 
median  0.0924  0.0417 11.23 0.1116  0.0488 10.12 
mean  0.0098  0.0062 2.77 0.0164  0.0082 5.35 
1st 
median  0.0116  0.0046 4.48 0.0162  0.0061 6.26 
mean  0.1206  0.0767 4.75 0.1615  0.0815 7.50 
2nd 
median  0.0873  0.0427 10.00 0.1151  0.0551  8.24 
mean  0.2662  0.1617 5.33 0.3300  0.1836 8.01 
3rd 
median  0.1841  0.1015 8.23 0.2510  0.1549 9.04 
mean  0.6730  0.3064 8.00 0.5682  0.3853 3.60 
4th 
median  0.5360  0.2597 9.83 0.3412  0.3279 2.53 
  32Table 5: Regression results  
The table reports the results of the regression  
() ( ) ( ) 01 2 3 4 5
j
i,t i i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t s ln MC ln P ln Notrans ln(Trdsize ) ΔΔ Δ ΔΔ Δ =γ +γ +γ +γ σ +γ +γ +ε  
j
i,t s Δ  is the difference in the execution cost measure between French stock i and the matched German stock on 
day t.   denotes the measure of execution costs (quoted and effective spread, adverse selection com-
ponent and realized spread). 
jq , e , a , r ∈
( ) i ln MC Δ  is the difference in the log of market capitalization between French 
stock i and the matched German stock.  , ln( ) it P Δ  is the difference in the log of the price;  i,t P  is the average 
transaction price of stock i on day t.   is the difference in return volatility, measured by the standard devia-
tion of midquote returns on day t.   is the difference in the log of the number of transactions for 
stock pair i on day t and   is the difference in the log of the average trade size (in €). The t-values 
in parentheses are based on GMM estimation.  
i,t σ Δ
( i,t ln Notrans Δ )
i,t ln(Trdsize ) Δ
 
  Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
 
q
i,t s Δ  
e
i,t s Δ  
a
i,t s Δ  
r
i,t s Δ  
q
i,t s Δ  
e
i,t s Δ  
a
i,t s Δ  
r
i,t s Δ  
constant  0.1275 
(9.05) 
0.0926 
(7.78) 
-0.0021 
(-0.20) 
0.0946 
(6.14) 
0.1475 
(8.79) 
0.1077 
(6.88) 
-0.0011 
(-0.12) 
0.1088 
(6.16) 
i ln(MC ) Δ   -0.2902 
(-3.62) 
-0.2887 
(-4.26) 
-0.0584 
(-1.02) 
-0.2303 
(-2.83) 
-0.0408 
(-1.00) 
-0.0399 
(-1.00) 
0.0087 
(0.37) 
-0.0486 
(-1.19) 
i,t ln(P ) Δ   -0.3667 
(-3.73) 
-0.2963 
(-3.02) 
-0.1856 
(-2.31) 
-0.1107 
(-1.12) 
-0.2432 
(-6.12) 
-0.2136 
(-6.08) 
-0.1229 
(-3.16) 
-0.0907 
(-2.15) 
i,t ln( ) Δσ  0.8552 
(4.87) 
0.7499 
(6.00) 
0.9534 
(5.86) 
-0.2034 
(-1.74) 
0.8000 
(3.82) 
0.6264 
(4.96) 
0.7732 
(4.36) 
-0.1469 
(-1.02) 
i,t ln(Notrans ) Δ   -0.0808 
(-7.54) 
-0.0660 
(-5.95) 
0.0047 
(0.53) 
-0.0707 
(-5.56) 
-0.0878 
(-6.93) 
-0.0604 
(-5.17) 
0.0103 
(1.12) 
-0.0707 
(-4.92) 
i,t ln(Trdsize ) Δ   -0.0770 
(-6.27) 
-0.0827 
(-6.41) 
0.0049 
(0.37) 
-0.0876 
(-4.96) 
-0.0524 
(-4.18) 
-0.0468 
(-3.42) 
0.0368 
(3.68) 
-0.0836 
(-5.08) 
2 R   0.3724 0.2934 0.2422 0.0812 0.2345 0.1737 0.1639 0.0598 
 
  33Table 6: Explaining transaction cost differences  
The table reports the results of the regression  
() ( ) ( )
()
01 2 3 4 5 6
7i , t 100 Reltick
j
i,t i i,t i,t i,t i
i,
i,t
t
ln(Trdsize ) s ln MC ln P ln Notrans LP ΔΔ ΔΔ Δ
Δ
Δ =γ +γ +γ +γ σ +γ +γ +γ
+γ +ε
 
j
i,t s Δ  is the difference in the execution cost measure between French stock i and the matched German stock on 
day t.   denotes the measure of execution costs (quoted and effective spread, adverse selection com-
ponent and realized spread). 
jq , e , a , r ∈
( ) i ln MC Δ  is the difference in the log of market capitalization between French 
stock i and the matched German stock.  i,t ln(P ) Δ  is the difference in the log of the price;  i,t P  is the average 
transaction price of stock i on day t.   is the difference in return volatility, measured by the standard devia-
tion of midquote returns on day t.   is the difference in the number of transactions for stock pair i 
on day t and   is the difference in the log of the average trade size (in €). LP
i,t σ Δ
( i,t ln Notrans Δ )
i,t ln(Trdsize ) Δ i,t is a dummy variable 
which takes on the value 1 when the German stock, but not its French counterpart, has a liquidity provider. 
 is the difference in the log of the relative tick size. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
GMM estimation.  
i,t ln(Reltick ) Δ
 
  Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
 
q
i,t s Δ  
e
i,t s Δ  
a
i,t s Δ  
r
i,t s Δ  
q
i,t s Δ  
e
i,t s Δ  
a
i,t s Δ  
r
i,t s Δ  
constant  0.1461 
(7.14) 
0.1096 
(6.06) 
-0.0104 
(-0.68) 
0.1201 
(5.30) 
0.1731 
(6.79) 
0.1311 
(5.30) 
0.0118 
(0.86) 
0.1193 
(4.53) 
i ln(MC ) Δ   -0.2408 
(-3.05) 
-0.2462 
(-3.81) 
-0.0788 
(-1.38) 
-0.1674 
(-2.08) 
-0.0288 
(-0.71) 
-0.0317 
(-0.80) 
0.0094 
(0.39) 
-0.0411 
(-1.01) 
i,t ln(P ) Δ   -0.3939 
(-3.86) 
-0.3202 
(-3.20) 
-0.1740 
(-2.18) 
-0.1462 
(-1.47) 
-0.2627 
(-6.92) 
-0.2269 
(-6.63) 
-0.1215 
(-3.13) 
-0.1053 
(-2.52) 
i,t ln( ) Δσ  0.8583 
(4.91) 
-0.7509 
(6.07) 
0.9529 
(5.84) 
-0.2020 
(-1.72) 
0.7952 
(3.82) 
0.6214 
(4.95) 
0.7712 
(4.35) 
-0.1498 
(-1.02) 
i,t ln(Notrans ) Δ   -0.0888 
(-7.91) 
-0.0730 
(-6.27) 
0.0080 
(0.80) 
-0.0810 
(-5.77) 
-0.0913 
(-6.97) 
-0.0625 
(-5.39) 
0.0116 
(1.23) 
-0.0740 
(-5.16) 
i,t ln(Trdsize ) Δ   -0.0771 
(-6.22) 
-0.0829 
(-6.37) 
0.0050 
(0.39) 
-0.0880 
(-5.00) 
-0.0475 
(-4.06) 
-0.0427 
(-3.29) 
0.0376 
(3.79) 
-0.804 
(5.02) 
LPi,t
0.0139 
(0.46) 
0.0100 
(0.38) 
0.0043 
(-0.20) 
0.0143 
(0.44) 
-0.0086 
(-0.28) 
-0.0153 
(-0.54) 
-0.0251 
(-1.37) 
0.0098 
(0.34) 
i,t 100 ln(Reltick ) Δ -1.2802 
(-2.97) 
-1.1162 
(-2.88) 
0.5351 
(-1.97) 
-1.6513 
(-3.64) 
-1.9910 
(-3.91) 
-1.5143 
(-3.54) 
-0.2469 
(-0.90) 
-1.2674 
(-2.82) 
2 R   0.3778 0.2980 0.2435 0.0899 0.2442 0.1804 0.1648 0.0641 
 
  34Table 7: Domestic Competition  
The table reports the results of the regression  
() ( ) ( )
() ()
01 2 3 4 5 6
7i , t 8 9 100 Reltick
j
i,t i i,t i,t i,t i
Xetra
ii i
i,
,
t
t
ln( s ln MC ln P ln Notrans LP
MS ln M
Trdsize )
C
ΔΔ Δ Δ ΔΔ
Δ
=γ +γ +γ +γ σ +γ ++γ +γ
+γ +γ +γ +ε
 
j
i,t s Δ  is the difference in the execution cost measure between French stock i and the matched German stock on 
day t.   denotes the measure of execution costs (quoted and effective spread, adverse selection com-
ponent and realized spread). 
jq , e , a , r ∈
( ) i ln MC Δ  is the difference in the log of market capitalization between French 
stock i and the matched German stock.  i,t ln(P ) Δ  is the difference in the log of the price;  i,t P  is the average 
transaction price of stock i on day t.   is the difference in return volatility, measured by the standard devia-
tion of midquote returns on day t.   is the difference in the number of transactions for stock pair i 
on day t and   is the difference in the log of the average trade size (in €). LP
i,t σ Δ
( i,t ln Notrans Δ )
i,t ln(Trdsize ) Δ i,t is a dummy variable 
which takes on the value 1 when the German stock, but not its French counterpart, has a liquidity provider. 
 is the difference in the log of the relative tick size.  i,t ln(Reltick ) Δ
Xetra
i MS  is the Xetra market share for Ger-
man stock i.  ( ) ln i MC  is the log of the average market capitalization of the stock pair i. The t-values in paren-
theses are based on GMM estimation.  
  Matching: cap., price, volatility  Matching: volume, price, volatility 
 
q
i,t s Δ  
e
i,t s Δ  
a
i,t s Δ  
r
i,t s Δ  
q
i,t s Δ  
e
i,t s Δ  
a
i,t s Δ  
r
i,t s Δ  
constant  0.6078 
(7.39) 
0.4536 
(6.19) 
-0.1200 
(-1.54) 
0.5736 
(5.67) 
0.7031 
(6.30) 
0.4761 
(4.85) 
-0.0781 
(-1.02) 
0.5542 
(4.77) 
i ln(MC ) Δ   -0.1509 
(-2.17) 
-0.1678 
(-2.95) 
-0.1140 
(-(2.01) 
-0.0538 
(-0.80) 
-0.0090 
(-0.24) 
-0.0202 
(-0.53) 
-0.0007 
(-0.03) 
-0.0195 
(-0.50) 
i,t ln(P ) Δ   -0.3177 
(-3.35) 
-0.2663 
(-2.789 
-0.1892 
(-2.42) 
-0.0771 
(-0.83) 
-0.3150 
(-8.19) 
-0.2607 
(-7.80) 
-0.1126 
(-2.85) 
-0.1482 
(-3.48) 
i,t ln( ) Δσ  0.8683 
(5.02) 
0.7570 
(6.02) 
0.9533 
(5.83) 
-0.1963 
(-1.65) 
0.8377 
(4.04) 
0.6519 
(5.15) 
0.7694 
(4.26) 
-0.1175 
(-0.80) 
i,t ln(Notrans ) Δ   -0.1063 
(-9.58) 
-0.0837 
(-7.27) 
0.0089 
(0.91) 
-0.0926 
(-6.54) 
-0.1230 
(-10.08) 
-0.0820 
(-6.32) 
0.0139 
(1.51) 
-0.0959 
(-6.15) 
i,t ln(Trdsize ) Δ   -0.0460 
(-3.94) 
-0.0605 
(-4.65) 
-0.0027 
(-0.20) 
-0.0578 
(-3.26) 
-0.0174 
(-1.53) 
-0.0225 
(-1.85) 
0.0316 
(3.19) 
-0.0541 
(-3.50) 
LPi,t
0.0130 
(0.39) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
0.0111 
(0.48) 
-0.0124 
(-0.36) 
-0.0202 
(-0.70) 
-0.0288 
(-1.04) 
-0.0108 
(-0.58) 
-0.0180 
(-0.65) 
i,t 100 ln(Reltick ) Δ -0.8281 
(-1.96) 
-0.6865 
(-1.72) 
0.2509 
(0.88) 
-0.9374 
(-1.93) 
-0.4439 
(-0.87) 
-0.5091 
(-1.49) 
-0.6028 
(-1.79) 
0.0938 
(0.21) 
Xetra
i MS   -0.2864 
(-1.97) 
-0.1294 
(-1.00) 
0.0730 
(-0.72) 
-0.0564 
(-0.35) 
-0.1600 
(-1.36) 
-0.0544 
(-0.47) 
-0.1406 
(-1.40) 
0.0861 
(0.64) 
() ln i MC   -0.0292 
(-2.15) 
-0.0303 
(-2.56) 
0.0217 
(2.16) 
-0.0520 
(-3.43) 
-0.0525 
(-4.03) 
-0.0390 
(-3.00) 
0.0265 
(2.57) 
-0.0655 
(-4.53) 
2 R   0.4127 0.3193 0.2469 0.1226 0.2829 0.1994 0.1682 0.0894 
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